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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this paper is to show that part of the fixed cost of a firm’s trade expansion is due 
to the acquisition of new internal capabilities (e.g., technology, production processes or skills), 
which implies a costly change in the firm’s internal labor organization. We investigate the 
relationship between a firm’s labor structure, in terms of the relative number of managers, and 
the scope of its export portfolio, in terms of its product-destination varieties. The empirical analysis 
is based on a matched employer-employee dataset covering the population of French firms from 
tradable sectors over the period 2009-2015. Our analysis suggests that market ex- pansion, both 
through export entry and export diversification, is associated with a change in the firm’s workforce 
composition, namely an increase in the number of managerial layers. These results are generally 
confirmed with the use of an instrumental variable approach to control for reverse causality. We 
show how these results are consistent with a simple model, where the complexity of a firm’s 
operations increases with the number of product-destination couples ex- ported and the 
manager’s role is to address the unsolved problems arising from such increased operational  
complexity.   
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JEL 
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Firm Export Diversification and Change in Workforce Composition 1
1 Introduction
The recent availibity of employer-employee linked datasets has allowed to study the empirical rela-
tion between a change in a firm’s international status and the distribution of skills in its domestic
workforce (Grossman, 2013). When a firm starts exporting or expanding its export portfolio, it may
hire professional workers to establish new dedicated teams (Bernard and Jensen, 1997; Biscourp
and Kramarz, 2007) or decentralize decision processes to better address the new production, mar-
keting and distribution problems (Marin and Verdier, 2014). It has indeed been shown that exporting
can be related to a shift in a firm’s employment structure toward higher skills (Serti et al, 2010; Iodice
and Tomasi, 2015). It follows that such an expansion in size and such a change in the overall nature
of skills should require an increase in the complexity of the firm’s management structure, as the-
oretically shown by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). However, to our knowledge, the relation
between export behaviour and the management structure of the firm has not yet been empirically
studied.
In the international economics literature, several theoretical mechanisms explaining why the
employees of exporters present higher skills have been introduced. The first hypothesis is that
exporters benefit from increasing returns to skills, hence they have a greater incentive to adoptmore
advanced technologies of production (Yeaple, 2005; Helpman et al, 2010; Amiti andDavis, 2012) or to
produce higher quality products (Verhoogen, 2008). Closer to our framework, Caliendo and Rossi-
Hansberg (2012) shows that exporters are required to change their internal labor organization to
raise their productivity and sustain the trade cost. In their model, firms that start exporting increase
the number of layers of management.
Most explanations so far consider the fixed cost of exporting to be external to the firm. Indeed,
the literature discusses the country-specific nature of sunk costs, such as the cost of complyingwith
foreign regulations, establishing distribution networks (Moxnes, 2010), or achieving high quality
standards (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012) and the cost associated with specific cultural and linguistic
barriers (Egger and Lassmann, 2015). Instead, the objective of this paper is to show that part of
the fixed cost of a firm’s trade expansion (through either export entry or export diversification) is
the acquisition of new internal capabilities (e.g., technology, production processes or skills), which
imply a (costly) change in the firm’s internal labor organization.
1This paper has benefited from comments of many seminar and conference participants at DEGIT 2017, ETSG 2015, CAED 2015, the Aarhus Inter-
national TradeWorkshop 2016 and the Maastricht University faculty seminar. We acknowledge financial support from the H2020 project: ‘Innovation-
fuelled, Sustainable, Inclusive Growth (ISIGROWTH)’ under grant agreement 649186.) This work is also supported by a public grant overseen by the
French National Research Agency (ANR) as part of the ‘Investissements d’avenir’ program (reference : ANR-10-EQPX-17, Centre d’accès sécurisé aux
données, CASD).
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The empirical relation between trade and the skill structure of firms has been studied in differ-
ent contexts (Bernard and Jensen, 1997; Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007; Serti et al, 2010; Iodice and
Tomasi, 2015). Their results indicate that because exporters demand more high-skilled workers,
this induces a rise in their labor costs, explaining the wage premium.2 Although these studies also
investigate the labor characteristics of exporters with respect to non-exporters, their aim is to ex-
plain the overall differences in wages, skills and productivity. Thus, they do not consider the way in
which these different types of workers are organized within the firm, which instead requires detailed
information on firms’ distribution of occupations and skills, which was recently made available in
matched employer-employee datasets, as we use here.
In the literature onmulti-product firms, a firm’s range of products is determined by both demand
and supply elements. Bernard et al (2010) consider stochastic shocks to firm productivity and to
consumer taste, Eckel and Neary (2010) distinguish between the competition and market-size ef-
fects, and Mayer et al (2014) study the effects of competition and the distance of the products from
the core competences of the firm. Caselli et al (2014) follow Eckel and Neary (2010) and Mayer et al
(2014) by considering the distance to the plant’s core expertise which defines its productivity level.
The important mechanism put forward in this discussion is that a product’s distance to the core
competences of the firm is assumed to drive its cost. Indeed, for a given knowledge level, the firm
reduces its productivity when enlarging its product scope.
Wewill extend the analysis of export diversification bymulti-product firms by considering export
varieties instead of products. As in Broda and Weinstein (2006), we define a variety as a product-
destination pair. Adding a new product to the export portfolio is either a product innovation; or a
product adaptation to the demand; or a product addition to capture new customers. In all cases,
adding a new product is a response to demand characteristics, in other words, it is also a response to
destination characteristics. A change in the product portfolio therefore has a strong relationwith the
targeted destination. On the other side, adding a destination requires the adjustment of the product
previously sold by the firm.3 Note that such adjustment in specifications (or customization through
packaging, design, secondary characteristics) may not often lead to a change in the classification of
the product. Using export varieties therefore serves the purpose of accounting for the intertwined
nature of product- and destination-types of diversification. 4 Building on the above insights, why
would export diversification, i.e., an increase in the number of products and/or destinations, impact
a firm’s labor organization?
The first part of the answer relates to the concept of complexity of products and destinations.
By adding products and/or destinations, the firm is more likely to encounter production, distribution
2Technological upgrading following trade liberalization has also been documented by Bustos (2011) in the case of Argentina. In turn, Verhoogen
(2008); Helpman et al (2010); Baumgarten (2013) show that the extension of trade, as a consequence of trade liberalization, for instance, increases
wage inequality within industries.
3There are only few cases when the addition of a destination does not imply a change in the product specifications – they concern very homoge-
nous goods.
4In the trade literature using firm-level data, export diversification is often associated with destination diversification. However in papers having a
more macroeconomic focus, export diversification is associated with product diversity as opposed to specialization (see Caselli et al, 2015; Imbs and
Wacziarg, 2003) and then it refers explicitly to sector/product differentiation. In particular, in Cadot et al (2011a;b), export diversification is analysed
through both dimensions: the product portfolio and the shipping destinations.
2
or marketing “problems” that need to be addressed at a higher management level. Reaching a new
destination alsomeans facing new administrative rules, prospecting new distribution networks, and
fitting new customers’ habits. All these issues call for additional competences. In parallel, when a
firm adds new products, it also augments the need for adapting both skills and production pro-
cesses. This is even more true because trade diversification is associated with investing in R&D
to face tougher foreign competition, as shown by Baum et al (2016). Thus, similar to Mayer et al
(2014), we associate changes in costs to modifications of the product (here, varieties) portfolio, but
we assume that the changes depend on the complexity of themodifications, which is amore general
assessment than the distance to the core competences of the firm. Second, trade diversification
also has a scale dimension: it is costly because the firm has to manage a higher number – a larger
scope – of different products and destinations, increasing the diversity of problems that must be
addressed. Therefore, both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of trade diversification increase
management complexity and should impact the internal labor organization of the firm.
However, building on the insights from Mayer et al (2014), the impact of trade diversification
on the necessity to implement organizational changes within the firm may depend on how much
more complex the new problems caused by trade diversification are with respect to the “business-
as-usual" activities in the firm. As we show in our model, a trade-off between the motivation to add
varieties to gain from economies of scope and the rise in costs due to the organizational changes
required to manage such increased complexity of operations may emerge. Therefore, an empirical
investigation is required to test the relation between the use of managers and the export diversifi-
cation behavior of firms.
Our empirical study is based on three French administrative datasets, and it focuses on the
relationship between a firm’s organization and export activity, exploiting employee-level data to
reconstruct the management structure of individual firms.5 The records of exporters’ individual
transactions are used to measure the scope of a firm’s export portfolio. Finally, balance sheet data
allow us to control for other firm-level characteristics.
We use a range of methods to test the empirical impact of export entry, and export diversifi-
cation on the probability to add a layer of management through OLS and probit regressions. In a
second step, we control for reverse causality by using an instrumental variable approach. Our find-
ings generally point to the fact that firms that are expanding their export portfolio have a higher
probability of adding managerial layers. First, we identify the impact of trade entry on the labor or-
ganization of a firm, as measured by the likelihood of adding a layer of managerial occupations. We
show that export entry has a different impact on the labor organization than does a mere change in
size (here, value added growth). Our results support a positive relationship between a firm’s trade
diversification and the likelihood that it changes its labor organization. We find that firms expanding
their export portfolio have a higher probability of adding managerial layers, after controlling for firm
growth, and we confirm these results with an instrumental variable approach.
Our work contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, we show that, on average,
a higher share of exporters in general, and among them, those with a greater number of export
5As in Caliendo et al (2015; 2017), we measure the ‘management structure’ from the occupational layers composing a firm’s workforce.
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product-destination varieties have a management layer, and that this result still holds after control-
ling for firm size (total sales). We argue that the increasing complexity that comeswith greater trade
diversification may constitute an important component of the sunk and fixed costs of exporting.
This is especially true if large upfront investments are required to restructure a firm’s organization
and if the cost of maintaining management layers is inelastic to variations in output volume. Sec-
ond, we show that trade matters for a firm’s hierarchical structure, not only because it expands its
market size (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Caliendo et al, 2017) but also because it increases
the complexity of a firm’s operations. To illustrate this intuition more formally, we present a simple
model in which the complexity of a firm’s operations depends on the number of product-destination
flows generated, and firms can choose to addmanagers to address this complexity more efficiently.
In the model, because the number of managers is less sensitive to the quantity produced than the
number of blue-collar workers, it acts as a fixed cost. Third, our work contributes to the growing
literature on the importance of managers for firm performance by proposing a reason why man-
agers are important for firm’s exporting performance. Since managers’ skills are needed for export
diversification, larger and more globalized firms would hire more managers with higher skills. Our
results support those by Bender et al (2018), who state that it is the skills of the group of managers
which matter most to translate the best management practices into higher firm performance.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our rich dataset, which compiles several
data sources. Section 3 displays the descriptive statistics, which illustrate our intuition regarding
the relation between trade diversification and labor organization. Section 4 outlines a simple the-
oretical framework of a multiproduct firm, which supports our empirical evidence. Section 5 tests
and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data.
2.1 Datasets.
Three main sources of data are required. The first one, the ‘Déclaration Annuelle de Données So-
ciales’ (DADS), gathers the compulsory information provided by firms each year to the social ad-
ministration about their employees. Each observation corresponds to a combination of a worker
and an establishment, both with a unique identifier. The variables of interest are the workers’ gross
wage, number of hours worked, type of contract (mainly used for data cleaning purposes) and oc-
cupational category (PCS, ‘Professions et Catégories Socioprofessionnelles’, 2003) at the 4-digit
level.
The second dataset gathers balance-sheet and performance variables per firm (FARE). Both
DADS and FARE are provided by the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) and cover the
universality of French firms, with the exceptions of firms with no employees and those belonging to
the agricultural sector. The third dataset is provided by the French customs administration (Custom-
DGDDI) and records all flows of imports and exports by product, destination and firm. It covers the
trade of merchandise and reports, at the product-firm level, the quantity (in Kg), the country of
4
destination, the product category (CN8), and the value of the export flow. This dataset allows us to
precisely trace the firms’ performance in foreign markets (i.e., their portfolio of exported products,
their prices proxied by their unit-values, patterns of entry and exit to/from foreign markets, and
variations in exported value over time).
All three datasets can be matched by using the firm identifier (SIREN), forming a longitudinal
dataset covering the period 2009-2015. Note that we restrict our analysis to the main tradable
sectors, which include manufacturing (NACE rev.2 sectors 10-33, C), Retail (NACE rev.2 sectors 45-
47, G) and ICT services (NACE rev.2 sectors 58-63, J). This is driven first by the use of tradable
goods statistics instead of services and because only focusing on manufacturing would exclude
numerous firms that export goods even though they belong to the services sector. Moreover, the
theoretical mechanisms on which we build relate to the firm’s need to reorganize production when
facing ability constraints (see Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012; Caliendo et al, 2015), which is
not solely bound to manufacturing firms. Product-diversification can be related to technological
adjustments. If that were the only focus, the manufacturing sector would seem like the obvious
one to study, because what manufacturing firms sell (i.e. export) is what they produce, so their
product portfolio is directly related to their internal capabilities. This is also the case of ICT firms,
which produce software for instance. When it comes to destination-diversification however, the
picture is less clear-cut. Also retail firms have to deal with the complexity of selling to markets
with different legislation, languages, and consumer preferences. Such type of diversification must
therefore play a role in influencing their workforce composition changes. In Mayer et al (2014), the
empirical analysis attached to the model is restricted to manufacturing exports in order to “ensure
that firms take part in the production of the goods they export”. Note however that their variable of
interest is productivity, which is much more difficult to measure accurately in services sectors.6 We
successively use two samples of firm-level data, depending on the object at hand. When studying
the decision to enter into exporting and its consequence on the labor organization of the firm, we
require firms to be present both in the FARE and DADS datasets (sample 1). Then, when analyzing
the export diversification behavior of firms, focusing on exporters only, we require that the firm is in
the Customs and DADS datasets, leading to a smaller set of observations (sample 2) and excluding,
de facto, smaller exporters that do not report their disaggregated trade flows.
Table 1 describes the population of firms in the two samples. We consider 2,955,088 obser-
vations, corresponding to 682,433 firms and 215,460 exporters (sample 1). Further, we can study
the export diversification behavior of nearly half of the latter group (86,924 exporters in sample 2).
Note that, as discussed in Bernini et al (2016), only a subset of firms always export, others being
intermittent exporters.
6Our choice is also driven by empirical considerations: in economies like France (but also the US), manufacturing stands for only 10% of total
GDP. Retailers of manufacturing goods have a large weight in total French export and exporters.
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Table 1: Observations description across samples, after cleaning. Manufacturing, retail and IT sec-
tors, 2009-2015.
Year DADS & FARE sample 1 & Customs
(sample 1) (sample 2)
All Non-exporters Exporters Exporters (customs)
2009 432,877 329,432 103,445 55,348
2010 428,162 323,873 104,289 56,159
2011 423,055 331,118 91,937 52,596
2012 420,154 329,366 90,788 52,825
2013 416,539 326,814 89,725 52,267
2014 413,626 323,971 89,755 51,694
2015 420,675 322,063 98,612 50,761
Total nb. obs. 2,955,088 2,286,637 668,451 371,650
Total nb. firms 682,433 446,675 215,460 86,924
# Firms alw. present 235,982 - - -
# Firms alw. exporters - - 91,639 47,074
2.2 Construction of variables.
Our aim is to assess the structure of the firms’ labor organization based on the available information
about the employees’ occupational category, following Caliendo et al (2015). Each employee in
the DADS database belongs to a “hierarchical layer” based on the first digit of his occupational
category. Consistent with the definition of Caliendo et al (2015), we identify four possible layers
from the bottom of the hierarchy (layer 1) to the top (layer 4). The first layer corresponds to clerks
and production workers (blue-collar workers); layer 2 corresponds to intermediate professionals
and technicians (supervisors); layer 3 corresponds to executives or senior staff (white collars); and
layer 4 is the top management (CEOs, directors). To focus on managerial functions, we then group
the layers into “production occupations" (layers 1 and 2) and “managerial occupations" (layers 3 and
4). We exclude those firms that do not have the first layer of occupations (9% of observations), i.e.,
without production or basic operation occupations. 7 Starting from the DADS employee database,
we construct firm-level variables by aggregating the information over each firm-SIREN. We then
merge such variables with the FARE and Customs dataset at the firm level.
We have two sources of information regarding exporters with different sample sizes and vari-
ables. The FARE dataset registers the total value of exports for all firms, with no legal obligation.
Instead, firms are legally bound to provide the customs institution information about their trade
flows (by product and destination) above a specified threshold value.8 We define exporting firms as
firms that declare export sales in the FARE dataset so we can also include smaller exporters.9
7In the group of firms we discard, ICT firms are over-represented compared to the retail and manufacturing sectors. In addition, those firms are
generally very small, but their workforce is relatively skilled, and their export performance is also quite high given their size.
8Export sales within the European Union need to be declared only if the yearly firm export sales are abovee 460,000 for the years 2011 and 2012,
and abovee 150,000 before 2011.
9Because most French firms entering into exports do it within the EU, and intra-EU trade flows only have to be reported above a threshold of
460,000 euros, we would miss most of the dynamics of export entry if we focused instead on the Customs data. Indeed, we would then identify as an
“entrant” a firm which was already exporting within the EU for some years and just happened to pass the threshold of 460,000 euros. For this reason,
we prefer using FARE to identify export entry in the first part of the paper.
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3 Empirics about labor organization and export behavior.
Starting from the model of Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), Caliendo et al (2015) introduced a
large amount of empirical evidence on production hierarchies. Focusing on the case of Frenchman-
ufacturing firms over the period 2002-2007, they find support for the theoretical model by Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012): the important growth events that firms experience are associated with
an increase in their number of hierarchical layers. Following a pyramidal firm structure, the growth in
the number of employees in the existing layers requires the hierarchy at the firm level to be strength-
ened, e.g., by assigning new managerial positions.
Although our data come from the same source, we cover a more recent period. After checking
that the results by Caliendo et al (2015) are also validated in our data, we find additional evidence
regarding the organizational structure of exporting firms. Our focus is on the exporters’ trade diversi-
fication in terms of products and destinations and its impact on changes in the organization of their
labor force, in particular, by observing the change in the presence and composition of managerial
layers relative to production or basic operations ones.
3.1 Firm characteristics and hierarchical structure.
We describe below how the firms in our sample are distributed according to the structure of their
hierarchical layers by aggregating based on the firms’ employee characteristics. The presence of
a layer within a firm is defined by at least one employee belonging to the corresponding occupa-
tional level. We observe the heterogeneity across firms along four dimensions: their total number
of layers, the presence of managerial layers, their size category and their export status (exporters
representing approximately 25% of the dataset, see Table 1).
We observe that if most firms in our sample have only a layer of “blue collars” (1-layer),10 5%
have a complete set of hierarchical layers (4-layers). Table 2 also shows that the distribution of
firms across number of layers differs for exporting firms, i.e., more exporters – 46% – have 3 or
4 layers, compared to 24% in the general population. Thus, the hierarchical structure of exporting
firms seems to be more complicated than that of non-exporting firms.
Next, we simplify the picture by focusing on two levels only: the “production occupations" (only
layer 1 or layers 1 and 2) or “managerial occupations" (layer 3, layer 4 or layers 3 and 4). Thus,
instead of counting the number of layers, regardless of the level, we identify firms according to
whether white collar occupations are present (“managerial occupation") or not (the bottom part of
Table 2). When using such a categorization, the distribution of firms is flipped when comparing
exporters (60% of firms with managerial occupations) to the general population (only 36%). Not
surprisingly, the hierarchical organization of firms is also explained by their size category; i.e., if
almost 100% of the largest firms have managerial occupations, only 35% of the smallest firms (53%
of the smallest exporters) do. Note that we can only observe employees who earn a salary, so we
10Note that in our cleaned sample, all firms have at least one layer, i.e., the lowest one. Therefore by construction, firms with only one employee
have the first layer. If we constrain the sample to the group of firms with at least five employees, we observe that the dynamic of hierarchies (i.e. the
share of firms adding or dropping layers pf management) is quite similar.
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Table 2: Percent of observations by number of layers and presence of managers conditional on size
classes, 2009-2015.
Size class [1− 20[ [20− 50[ [50− 250[ [250−+[ all
All firms
1-layer 49.4 10.1 1.9 0.2 51.8
2-layers 31.2 21.0 8.3 2.2 24.2
3-layers 17.4 48.6 52.6 47.9 18.9
4-layers 2.0 20.3 37.2 47.7 5.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Exporting firms
1-layer 29.7 2.9 0.5 0.0 27.5
2-layers 38.1 13.7 3.8 0.7 26.2
3-layers 26.8 54.7 52.3 48.1 32.2
4-layers 5.5 28.7 43.5 51.2 14.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100
All firms
Without managerial occupations 64.6 22.1 6.5 1.7 63.8
With managerial occupations 35.4 77.9 93.5 98.3 36.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Exporting firms
Without managerial occupations 47.2 10.5 2.4 0.3 39.9
With managerial occupations 52.8 89.5 97.6 99.7 60.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: DADS-FARE, Sample 1.
miss manager-owners (who do not earn a salary). This is why firms without a layer of managers are
mostly small firms in which the owner is the uniquemanager without being registered in managerial
jobs.
In addition to these static characteristics, we are interested in the labor organization dynamics,
as we study its relation to the export diversification. How often do firms add or drop a layer of
management? Table 3 shows that most firms maintained a stable organizational structure between
2009 and 2014. However, exporters were more likely to change their organizational structure. If
we suppose that adding a managerial layer can be associated with firm expansion in general and
export expansion in particular, what can explain when a firm eliminates managers? Although this is
beyond the scope of this paper, eliminating the managers’ layer may be observed in firms that are
close to exiting or in a process of rationalizing the group organization to which they belong.
Table 4 displays the firm characteristics that are conditional on the presence of managerial
occupations. Not surprisingly, firms with managers are larger, considering different size proxies.
They also have a higher probability to export and, conditional on exporting, have a higher export
intensity. Additionally, given the well-known size-wage and export-wage premia, we find a positive
correlation between the presence of managers among employees and the mean hourly wage. This
is coherent with the work of Caliendo et al (2015) on hierarchical layers and of Egger et al (2017) on
export premium.
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Table 3: Change in the presence of a layer of managers over the period 2009-2015.
Percent
∆ Managerial All firms Exporters Non-Exporters
occupations
Dropping: -1 5.23 6.63 4.58
No change: 0 90.10 87.08 91.50
Adding: +1 4.67 6.29 3.92
Sources: DADS-FARE, Sample 1.
Table 4: Mean characteristics of firms by hierarchical structure, 2009-2015.
# Layers Firm size proxies Export performance Labor charact.
Nb. Value Sales Exp. Exp. Hourly
employees added propensity intensity wage
Without managerial occup. 5.4 152.6 639.8 0.14 0.13 11.32
With managerial occup. 47.7 2,213.8 11,035.5 0.38 0.16 17.26
t test *** *** *** *** *** ***
Sources: DADS-FARE, Sample 1.
We summarize the first set of statistical results as follows:
Empirical fact 1 (2) The organizational structure of exporting firms is more complex than that of non-
exporting firms, as the former are more likely to have managerial occupations.
3.2 Number of products, destinations and layers.
In a next step, we precisely measure the diversification intensity of exporters, with the aim of linking
the cost of diversification to the labor organization of firms. Indeed, two exporting firms with similar
overall export sales would differ in their diversification intensity if they serve a different number
of product-destination couples, which we label as varieties. Thus, the number of export varieties
delivers information about a firm’s trade diversification, regardless of its export intensity. A firm that
sells one product (defined at the 8-digit level) to two different destinations exports two varieties.
By using export data from the French customs (referring to our sample 2, see Table 1), we track the
total number of product-destination couples (i.e., varieties) a firm exports per year.11
The number of varieties per firm ranges from 1 to 17455, with 50% of exporters shipping fewer
than 7 varieties and 95% fewer than 164.12 To complement the information about the number of
varieties, we compute a Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) at the firm level to appreciate the extent
of the diversity of varieties in terms of exported value. For instance, a firm that exports two varieties
11The results presented in this paper are robust when using the firms’ total number of exported products or destinations as the diversification
measure. The results are available from the authors upon request.
12The number of products per firm ranges from 1 to 835, with 50% of exporters shipping fewer than 4 products and 95% fewer than 45. The number
of destinations per firm ranges from 1 to 168, with 50% of exporters shipping to fewer than 4 destinations and 95% to less fewer 43 destinations.
We also group the destinations by geographical area. The geographical areas are Europe, Africa, Asia, North-America, Central and South America,
Middle-East, Oceania and Others. The number of areas per firm ranges from 1 to 8, with 50% of exporters shipping to fewer than 2 areas and 95% to
fewer than 7 areas.
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Table 5: Average export diversification indicators conditional on managerial occupations, 2009-
2015.
# Varieties # New Varieties HHI varieties
NC8 SH4 NC8 SH4 NC8 SH4
Without managerial occupations 9.13 6.91 3.68 2.40 0.61 0.64
With managerial occupations 48.31 31.81 14.32 8.08 0.45 0.48
t-test *** *** *** *** *** ***
Sources: DADS-FARE-Customs, Sample 2.
such that it splits its export value into two equal shares ismore diversified than is a firm that exports
98% of its sales in variety A and 2% in variety B. Therefore, we consider that the higher the HHI is,
the lower the diversification is. By construction, the HHI ranges between 0 and 1. The distribution
of varieties among population of firms is very much skewed and follows a Pareto-like distribution,
in coherence with other evidence about exporters’ portfolio in other countries (see for instance,
Bernard et al (2009) for US firms, Wagner (2012) for German firms, and Amador and Opromolla
(2013) for Portuguese firms). We then cross the information on export diversification with the labor
characteristics of the firm (having a layer of managers). We expect that a larger number of varieties
is positively correlated with a demand in complex management. It follows that we should find a
positive correlation between the presence of managerial occupations and the number of varieties
and a negative correlation with the HHI. We also compute the number of new varieties in year t per
firm – which means that it has never been present in the varieties portfolio of the firm the years
before t (for the span of years we observe in our dataset).13
We consider two levels of disaggregation. Defining the varieties at the 8-digit level means that
we define a variety with respect to the finest level of product disaggregation (NC8), while the vari-
eties at the 4-digit level refer to the SH4 disaggregation. If the classification is disaggregated more
and has more consecutive identifiers, then the products are close to each other. Thus, a change in
an 8-digit product without a change in the first 4 digits is a weaker diversification than if the change
occurs at the 4-digit level. Considering two levels of disaggregation allows the impact of the inten-
sity of diversification to be tested. Note that a change at the 2-digit level would imply an even more
radical diversification. However, at this level, the diversification is too rare to be studied properly.
Table 5 confirms that a firm with managers is more likely to export more products and/or ship
to more destinations. Moreover, the presence of managers is also associated with a higher level
of new varieties, on average. As expected, all indicators of diversification are positively correlated
with the presence of managers’ occupations. Moreover, the HHI in terms of varieties is lower with
managers than it is without (recalling that a high HHI value is a signal of weak diversification). This
evidence confirms our intuition that amore diversified firm– that splits its production and shipment
over several product-destination couples in relatively more equal weights – has a higher need for
managers.
The above indicators show that French exports cover a very broad portfolio of varieties. How-
13A variety is not considered a new one in the year the firm enters the database.
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Table 6: Changes in the trade portfolios of firms between 2009-2015.
∆# Varieties Percent. of firms
< −75% 5.7
]− 50%,−75%] 7.9
]0,−50%] 18.2
0% 31.6
]0, 50%] 10.9
]50%, 100%] 10.6
> 100% 15.1
Sources: DADS-FARE-Customs, Sample 2.
Table 7: Managers’ intensity per quartile of varieties, controlling for firm size, 2009-2015.
% Firms with
managerial occup.
NC8 SH4
Q1 # varieties 0.60 0.60
Q2 # varieties 0.66 0.65
Q3 # varieties 0.74 0.74
Q4 # varieties 0.83 0.83
Q5 # varieties 0.93 0.93
Sources: DADS-FARE-Customs, Sample 2.
ever, how many firms modify their portfolio over time? Only 31.6% of firms keep their portfolio of
varieties unchanged during the 5-year period, while nearly 27% change more than 50% of their port-
folio.
As a further step, we group exporting firms by the quartile of number of varieties, controlling
for firm size. Indeed, we want to disentangle, to the greatest extent possible, the labor organiza-
tion patterns due to expansion (as measured by firm size) with respect to the role of management
complexity due to trade diversification. Table 7 shows that the share of firms with managerial oc-
cupations increases with the quartiles.
The additional statistics lead to formulating the following second empirical fact.
Empirical fact 2 (2) Among exporters, the presence of managerial occupations is positively associ-
ated with trade diversification.
Next, we present the theoretical mechanisms that could explain these two empirical facts. We
propose a theoretical framework that links the relative number of managers of multiproduct firms
with their trade diversification decisions.
4 Model.
Our aim is to assess the impact of an increase in trade diversification on the labor organization
of the firm. The model gives a theoretical understanding of the link between a firm’s portfolio of
varieties, complexity of operations and a need to augment the number of managers. We define
export diversification as the addition of a new product-destination couple to the firm portfolio of
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products and destinations. Export diversification is very close to an increase in export performance
but may be different in terms of a rise in the export intensive margin.
Mayer et al (2014) modeled how a firm’s range of exported products is affected by competi-
tion across market destinations. They find that firms react to increased competition by focusing on
their “core”, best-performing products. It supports the idea that the product mix and the destination
portfolio of exporters are not independent but coevolve. Moreover, their model implies that foreign
competition changes the organization of competences in the firm. We augment the model by Mayer
et al (2014) with the findings of Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) on the relation between mar-
ket expansion and firm reorganization and with those of Ottaviano and Thisse (1999) on the firm’s
revenue side. Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) proposed a model of the organization of knowl-
edge and labor within a firm in response to an exogenous demand for differentiated products. The
organization of knowledge and labor involves determining the number of managers needed to solve
the problems encountered by the employees. Contrary to Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), we
model only two layers of employees: workers and managers. Given an exogenous distribution of
problems faced by the firm, its productivity level depends on the number of managers it uses and
on the managers’ skills.
Next, we describe the demand (section 4.1) and the supply sides (section 4.2) of the model. The
predictions of our theoretical framework are then tested in our empirical analysis (section 5) below.
4.1 The demand side.
We model the demand as in Mayer et al (2014). The utility function of an individual consumer c de-
pends on the consumption of a numeraire good qc0 and on the consumption of differentiated prod-ucts qci distributed over a continuum Ω, as follows:
U = qc0 + α
∫
i∈Ω
qcidi−
1
2
γ
∫
i∈Ω
(qci )
2di− 1
2
η
(∫
i∈Ω
qci
)2
di (1)
where the demand parameters α, γ and η are all positive. The larger the value of γ, the greater the
consumers’ desire for variety is, and the faster their utility increaseswhen they smooth consumption
over varieties i in Ω. The parameter η determines the degree to which the aggregate consumption
of all varieties reduces the marginal utility from the consumption of individual varieties. This utility
function generates the following inverse demand for individual varieties:
pi = α− γqci − ηQc (2)
where pi is the price of variety i andQc is the consumer’s aggregate consumption of all differenti-
ated varieties. By inverting (2), we obtain the following linear demand:
qi ≡ Lqci =
αL
ηN + γ
− L
γ
pi +
ηN
ηN + γ
L
γ
p¯ (3)
where qi is the aggregate consumption of variety i across L consumers in the market. N is the
number of differentiated varieties in that market, and p¯ = 1
N
∫
i∈Ω∗ pidi is the average price fordifferentiated goods. Ω∗ is the subset of varieties in the market whose price pi is low enough not
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to drive demand in eq. (3) to 0. Note that only the varieties with price pi < pMAX , where pMAX ≡
1
ηN+γ
(γα + ηNp¯), have positive demands.
4.2 The supply side.
We model the variety portfolio of a firm as a set of product-destination couples Θ = [1, . . . , θ],
where the elements are indexed by a continuous series of integers that increase the cost of pro-
ducing each variety. By assuming that it is easier for the firm to operate in the domestic market,
a firm that sells only on the domestic market has a narrower set of product-destination couples.
Instead of supposing that the firm is only exporting and does not produce for the domestic market,
we collapse the domestic multi-product firm into a single-product firm. It reflects the assumption
that adding products to serve the domestic market represents a lower-level of complexity-upgrade,
since the customer market (preferences, competitors, legislation) is already known to the firm. In-
stead, and in line with previous empirical and theoretical results (Bernard and Jensen, 1997; 1999),
starting to export requires extra skills and knowledge. 14
An exporter has at least two product-destination items: one product and two destinations (do-
mestic and foreign). The last element of set Θ represents the product-destination with the highest
production cost for the firm. The same product exported to different markets may have different
positions in Θ, reflecting the adjustment of costs to meet destination-specific tastes.15 We also
include the economies of scope through a fixed cost G, which drives the decision on the product
range.16 More precisely, the product range is the number of varieties the firms offer, θ, which is also
the level of diversification and product-complexity of the firm. 17
We assume that exporters follow a pecking order when adding new product-destination couples
to their portfolio: they initially export to ‘easier’ product-destinations, and they later add more diffi-
cult items to their portfolio.18 This assumption allows us to relate an exporters’ optimal managerial
structure to the most difficult product exported θ. In addition to the fixed costG, we model the cost
associated with the difficulty of producing additional varieties. Next, we model a representative
firm and we drop the exponent j to simplify the presentation. Note, however, that the variables are
firm-specific.
14From an empirical perspective, the lack of focus on domestic diversification is driven by the data we have: only export sales can be broken down
into products; domestic sales are aggregated. However, we argue that such simplification does not contradict our predictions. Indeed, it may be that
(unobserved) domestic diversification leads to workforce changes too, however this does not lead to interpret wrongly a positive impact, if any, of
trade diversification on the need for managers.
15The cost side of this section is based on Mayer et al (2014) and the findings of Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012). The revenue side is based
on the framework of Ottaviano and Thisse (1999).
16Irrespective of the demand size, a firm has an incentive to produce more than one product because it spreads the fixed cost G over differentiated
products allowing to serve different customers. The fixed costG is therefore needed to model economies of scope. G has no other utility in the rest
of the model.
17The model does not explicitly account for the size of the destination market or trade costs, however both aspects are indirectly included. Indeed
all varieties are ranked in terms of their complexity (how difficult/costly it is to add such product-destination couple). Therefore trade costs and
destination size are reflected in this ranking. A further development of the model could disentangle different dimensions of export-related costs and
gains - the purpose of this paper is however to provide an initial account of the general impact of trade diversification on the hierarchical structure
of the firm.
18This assumption is supported by empirical evidence on Mexican multi-product exporters provided by Iacovone and Javorcik (2010).
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Each production possibility is associated with a random level of difficulty. Therefore, the blue-
collar worker must solve each problem to deliver one unit of output. The probability that a worker
solves the problem is described by the following function:
F (z, θ) = 1− e−( 1θ )z (4)
where z is the skill level of each blue-collar worker. If the skill of the firm’s worker increases, the
probability of encountering an unsolved problem decreases. If there are managers in the firm, the
complement of F (.) is the probability that the problem will be handed over to the manager. If there
is no manager, the problem is left unsolved and it determines the firm’s constraint of capacity/size.
This capacity limit therefore also represents an incentive to hire a manager. Of course, the problem
can stay unsolved but it limits the firm’s growth.19 As the firm extends its export portfolio toward
more difficult product-destination items (i.e., a larger θ), the last exported item generates more
difficult problems to solve. This is reflected by the fact that F (z, θ) decreases in θ. A greater
number of unsolved problems determines a greater number of wasted production possibilities, and
a larger marginal cost.
Let’s assume that the firm can hire a number of managers nm that are more skilled than workers
such that zm > z. With an additional organization layer, the problems unsolved by the blue-collar
workers can be passed on to at least one manager in each firm, who would use h units of time to
solve the problem. Thus zm determines the production constraint at the firm level, as follows:
nwA(1− e−( 1θ )zm) > q (5)
where A is the firm-specific average productivity that is common across all products produced by
the firm. More specifically, A is the average number of ‘production possibilities’ generated by a
worker of the firm in one unit of time. q is the total production of the firm. If zm is high for a given
number of workers nw , then the quantity that can be produced, q, is higher. 20
If the problem costs h units of a manager’s time, the firm needs at least nm managers to handle
the expected number of problems that cannot be dealt with directly by the workers, as follows:
nm = (h)(nw)e
−( 1
θ
)z (6)
The need for managers to face the unsolved problems, which increases with the number of
varieties, is stronger when the firm diversifies its export portfolio. This leads to the following:
Lemme 1 For a given skill of workers z, the need for managers increases with the number of varieties
produced by the firm.
Moreover, the manager-to-worker ratio then increases with the number of product-destinations
θ and decreases with z, as follows:
19 There is a trade-off between the gains and costs of hiring managers, therefore it may be possible – for instance if the wage difference is very
high, given by a high parameter k – that the firm may find it optimal to remain “small” (i.e. without managers).
20The difference between workers’ and managers’ skill level zm is necessary to understand that the firm encounters a limit to grow. A firm without
managers is constrained in the complexity of its activities. Hiring manager(s) with a higher skill level allows to overcome such a constraint.
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∂(nm/nw)
∂θ
=
z
θ2
(h)e−(
1
θ
)z > 0 (7)
∂(nm/nw)
∂z
=
−1
θ
(h)e−(
1
θ
)z < 0 (8)
‘Difficult’ product-destinations generate a greater number of production-distribution problems
that are beyond the workers’ skills, implying a higher manager-to-worker ratio.21 This result can be
formulated as follows:
Proposition 1 Export entry requires a higher number of managers.
This proposition is in line with our empirical fact number 1 and is supported by the evidence
presented in Table 5 and 7 (left columns) in the previous section.
Proposition 2 Trade diversification (i.e., a higher θ) requires a higher number ofmanagers, a necessary
condition to add a layer of managers.
This proposition is in line with our empirical fact number 2 and is supported by the evidence
presented in Table 5 in the previous section.
Proposition 3 The number of managers relative to workers increases with the scope of a firm’s export
portfolio θ and decreases with the skill level of the workers z.
4.3 The cost function.
Production uses labor as the only variable factor of production. The variable cost function is then
written as follows:
C(θ, A, z) = nwω + nmkω (9)
whereω is the unit-cost of labor for workers with skill level z. The wages ofmanagers are higher,
where k is the cost premium associated with their higher skill level.
The firm chooses the value nw that minimizes its cost, subject to two constraints: (6) and (5).
The marginal cost of producing and exporting varieties up to item θ is then as follows (see the proof
in the Appendix):
υ(θ, A, z) = φ =
ω
A(1− e− zmθ ) (10)
In contrast to (4), the relevant skill parameter at the numerator of 5 is the managers’ skill level
zm. This reflects the fact that when workers are assisted bymanagers, any problem unsolved by the
workers can be passed through the organizational structure to the upper layer. It is also important
to note that the marginal cost is associated with the total amount of production at the firm level, q.
21Note that this result is independent of the size or scale of the firm for a given θ.
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(11) below shows that the marginal cost increases with θ and decreases with the managers’ skill
zm.
∂υ(θ, A, z)
∂θ
= ω
(
A− Ae− zmθ
)−2(
zm
θ2
)
Ae−
zm
θ > 0 (11)
4.4 The optimal production level.
In our setting, domestic producers choose to produce a single variety (θ = 1) because they do
not benefit from economies of scope. Then, the profit function of domestic producers is pi(A, z) =
L
4γ
{
vD− ω
A(1−e− zmθ )
}2. Instead, when θ > 1, the firm is no longer a single-variety type. Production
requires a fixed entry cost to be paid to enter the foreign market, G, regardless of the number of
varieties, indicating that firms benefit from economies of scope once they start exporting. Following
Ottaviano and Thisse (1999), multi-product firms face an aggregate demand for several varieties,
where qi corresponds to the demand for each variety. Thus, firm j is facing q = ∫i∈Θj qidi, where
Θj is the set of varieties produced by firm j, with Θj ∈ Ω∗. Then, θj is the number of varieties in
this set.
Compared to single-product firms, multi-product firms interact with each other through their
decision regarding the scope of their varieties relative to the market size. The total number of vari-
eties Ω∗ is distributed among J firms facing an identical entry costG in addition to their labor cost
depending on the managers skill as in (9).
The profit function for multi-product firms is then as follows:
pi(m,A, z) =
∫
i∈Θj
piqidi− nwω − nmωk −G (12)
We suppose that pi is given to the firm and that firms choose to produce a certain number
of varieties, which determines its market share over Ω∗. Here, we do not consider any impact on
price because the set of varieties is sufficiently large to prevent any firm, by clustering a subset of
varieties, from affecting the average market price.
From (2) and (3), we get the following:
pi =
αγ
ηN + γ
− γ
L
qi +
ηN
ηN + γ
p¯ = pmax − γ
L
qi (13)
Then, introducing (13) into (12) gives :
pi(θ, A, z) =
∫
i∈Θ
(
pmax − γ
L
qi
)
qidi− nwω − nmωk −G (14)
pi(θ, A, z) = pmax
∫
i∈Θ
qidi− γ
L
∫
i∈Θ
q2i di− nwω − nmωk −G (15)
Maximizing the profit function relative to q, we obtain the optimal quantity q∗ at the firm level.
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q∗ =
θL
2γ
[
pmax − ω
A
(
1− e− zmθ
)] (16)
It shows that the firm size increases with θ and with the manager’s skill zm. As expected, the
size increases with productivity and with the size of the market L.
Proposition 4 The optimal size increases with trade diversification. It also increases with the man-
ager’s skill zm.
The optimal level of θ is determined by themanager’s skill zm, which comes from the distribution
of managers’ skill Z in the market. It creates productivity heterogeneity, which determines a firm’s
ability to trade-diversify. At the equilibrium, this distribution Z drives the total number of varieties
and, finally, the competitiveness of the country and its world market share.
In conclusion, the model provides support to the previous empirical findings and directions for
the econometrics. It explains that the labor organization is associated with trade diversification
because the latter implies that there are additional problems to address. It displays a clear trade-
off between the scale effect, which motivates the addition of varieties, and the organizational cost,
which implies a higher manager-to-worker ratio. This trade-off is affected by the cost of managers
and their skill level relative to workers. Although the dynamics are not directly studied, the model
provides insight into the changes in a labor organization in response to the decision to increase
trade diversification. Indeed, we expect that the complexity of labor organization and the presence
of managers are explained by trade diversification. We also expect that a change in the number
of hierarchical layers is associated with a change in trade diversification and, specifically, that the
probability of adding a layer of managers increases when firms add new varieties to their portfolios.
In the next section, we present some econometric tests of the dynamics suggested by the model.
5 Explaining the change in the number of managerial layers.
Our preliminary descriptive statistics support the main features described by the model. Exporting
firms and firms with higher export diversification have more complex labor organizations. Next, we
test the dynamic implications of themodel. We infer that a firm that decides to enter foreignmarkets
or augment its number of varieties has to implement organizational changes to face the additional
complexity. Hence, the descriptive evidence and the model both suggest that the addition of a layer
of managers is positively linked to export entry and diversification.
More precisely, we obtain two testable hypotheses from the model: 1) Export entry (i.e., θ in-
creases from 0 to a strictly positive value) requires a higher number of managers, which increases
the probability of adding a layer of management; 2) a higher number of varieties requires a higher
number of managers, which increases the probability of adding a layer of management.
However, the results could be driven by other changes in the firm’s characteristics, such as firm
size. Therefore, we control for firm size and firm growth to disentangle the organizational changes
related to growth vs. changes in the trade patterns.
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We start by testing the first proposition related to export entry, and then we analyze the relation
between trade diversification and the probability of adding a layer of management. In this second
part, we also instrument export diversification in order to control for potential reverse causality.
5.1 Export entry and the addition of a layer of managers.
Export entry can be considered the first level of export diversification, as shown by the model. In-
deed, adding a new foreign market to the domestic market is a signal of trade diversification. In
what follows, we test whether export entry impacts the probability of adding a layer of managers.
The estimation sample comprises only firms that do not have a layer of management in the previous
period. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the firm adds
one layer of managers to its organizational structure. Export entry is a dummy variable that takes
a value of one in year t if the firm was not an exporter in year t− 1 but does export in year t, and it
is zero otherwise.22
Thus, this specification allows the identification of whether export entry into foreignmarkets is a
good explanatory variable of the decision to add a layer ofmanagers, controlling for other covariates
that could explain this decision.
To disentangle the “pure” growth from the export diversification channel explaining the addition
of a layer of managers, we add the log growth of the (deflated) value added to the set of explana-
tory variables and measure the interaction effect between firm growth and the export entry vari-
able. Additional controls include labor productivity (deflated value added over the number of hours
worked), in logs; size (the number of employees), in logs; and the number of occupations (occupa-
tional categories defined at the 3-digit level, which can be considered as a measure of idiosyncratic
diversification of jobs), in logs. The year and the 2-digit level sector fixed effects are also introduced.
Although the dependent variable is binary, we start by using a simple OLS regression with robust
standard errors, clustered at the firm level. We then estimate a probit regression.
The results in Table 8 show a positive and significant impact of export entry on the probability
of adding a layer of managers in all our specifications. For the probit estimator, the coefficients
displayed in the table correspond to the marginal effect of a change in the explanatory variable
on the probability of adding a layer of managers. Hence, entering foreign markets augments the
probability of adding a layer of managers by 0.007 percentage points. Value added growth is also
associated with an increase in the target probability, and we find a complementarity effect of grow-
ing and starting to export, leading to an overall impact of export entry of 0.01 points. If growing
alone has a greater impact on the probability, the regression results support the independent role
of export.
We have performed several additional tests revealing the robustness of our results to the inclu-
sion of sector× year fixed effects (see Table B. 1. 1, section B. 2), accounting for the sector-specific
dynamics over time; when limiting the analysis to the manufacturing sector – which is often the
22Note that we use here the large sample, sample 1, as export entry is better identified in the FARE dataset. To be precise, export entry means that
the firm reports positive export sales in t and zero export sales in the previous period.
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Table 8: Impact of export entry on the probability of adding a layer of management, 2009-2015.
Dependent Var. : Adding a layer of managers
OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exp. entry 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.007***
Log Growth VA 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007***
Gr VA * Exp 0.012*** 0.003***
Log Labor Prod. 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001***
Log Occupations 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.073*** 0.073***
Log Size -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005***
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Nb. obs 1,154,960 1,154,960 1,154,960 1,154,960
R-squared 0.08 0.08
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.21
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000
Sources: DADS-FARE, Sample 1.
Firms with no layer of management in year t− 1.
OLS standard errors clustered at the firm level.
case in similar literature, especially the trade literature addressing questions related to firm pro-
ductivity which is not easy to measure in services (see Table B. 1. 2, section B. 2); and the exclusion
of some of our control variables (see Table B. 1. 3, section B. 2).
5.2 Export diversification and the addition of a layer of managers.
We now focus on exporters only (those present in the Customs dataset, i.e. sample 2), and we test
the explanatory power of export diversification with respect to the probability of adding a layer of
management. Export diversification is measured in a number of ways. To the standard approach
(number of export varieties, concentration of the portfolio) we add a set of variables reflecting a true
effort on the part of the firm: the addition of “new-to-the-firm” varieties (i.e. not previously observed
in the portfolio of the firm, within our dataset). Indeed, when only observing the number of varieties
we may miss some of the dynamics in firms’ export portfolio: firms may drop products while adding
a new one, or re-export an older one. We count the number of new varieties each year and define:
i) a dummy variable for the presence of new varieties or not; iii) the share of new varieties relative
to the total of varieties a firm exports and iii) the log number of new varieties. The second and third
items reflects whether such changes are expected to have a major weight in the operations of the
firm, therefore calling for a change in the workforce composition of the firm.
In Table 9, we compute two sets of probit regressions, alternatively considering varieties at
the NC8 or SH4 disaggregation levels. In each set, we use as dependent variables the number of
varieties (col. 1); ii) a change in the Herfindhal index of varieties (col. 2); the new variety dummy
(col. 3); the share of new varieties (col. 4); and the number of new varieties (col. 5).
The diversification decision increases the probability of adding a layer of managers in all our
specifications. The specification with the change in the Herfindhal index (col. 2) allows us to evalu-
ate both the evolution in the portfolio of varieties and the extent of such a change. The coefficients
19
are, as expected, negative but weaker compared to the previous measures (and not significant in
the case of 4-digit varieties, Panel B). The new varieties dummy (col. 3) allows to evaluate the
magnitude of the impact. New varieties augment to probability to add a layer of management by 1
percentage point when the varieties are observed at the 8-digit level and by 1.2 percentage points
when the varieties are observed at the 4-digit level. When considering the impact of the share of
a new variety, the impact rises to 2.6 percentage points (2.7 at the 4-digit level). Finally the com-
parison of the first and last specifications tells us indeed that the number of new varieties explains
the decision to add a layer of management better than the number of varieties alone. As the regres-
sion controls for firm growth and other idiosyncratic characteristics, we can conclude that trade
diversification has a specific positive impact on the probability of adding managers.
The comparison of the coefficients’ magnitude across the two levels of product disaggregation
tests one of the hypothesis from the model. In the model, we assume that the higher the complexity
implied by diversification is, the higher the likelihood it affects the relative number of managers.
Since a new variety is likely to demandmore changes in the way the firm operates at the 4-digit level
than is a “novelty" that is only observed at the 8-digit level, we expect the impact of the “novelty"
on the probability of adding a layer of managers to be higher at the 4-digit level. We confirm this
expectation and observe higher marginal effects in columns (1), (3) and (4) but not in column (5).
The difference is largest in column (3) (having new varieties vs. none).
As in the previous section, we test whether these results are robust to a range of different spec-
ifications. We find that they are confirmed when we use an OLS estimation – with robust standard
errors, clustered at the firm level – (Table B. 2. 4 in section B.), when including sector× year fixed
effects (Table B. 2. 5 in section B.), and when excluding some of our control variables (Table B. 2.
6 in section B.). However, when limiting our analysis to the manufacturing sector (Table B. 2. 7 in
section B.), only the log number of new varieties has a positive impact on the probability to add a
management layer in that case. This may indicate that in the manufacturing sector, the addition
of a layer of management is better explained by growth processes (sales and value added) than by
trade-related constraints.
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Table 9: Labor organization change and trade diversification - Probit - 2009-2015
Dependent Var. : Adding a layer of managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Probit Regressions - 8-digit variety
Log # Varieties 0.006***
∆ Herfind. -0.011**
Dummy new var. 0.009**
Share new var. 0.026***
Log # New Varieties 0.010***
Log Growth VA 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.013***
Exp. Int. 0.045*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.041***
Log # Occupations 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.196***
Log Labor Prod. 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007***
Log Size -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.037***
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Nb. obs 52,439 52,439 41,721 41,721 35,438
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Probit Regressions - 4-digit variety
Log # Varieties 0.007***
∆ Herfind. -0.007
Dummy new var. 0.012***
Share new var. 0.027***
Log # New Varieties 0.009***
Log Growth VA 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.014***
Exp. Int. 0.045*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.057***
Log # Occupations 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.209***
Log Labor Prod. 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008**
Log Size -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.040***
Nb. obs 52,439 52,439 44,378 44,378 22,948
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sources: DADS-FARE-Customs, Sample 2.
Firms with no layer of management in year t− 1.
Displaying probit average marginal effects.
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5.3 Addressing endogeneity
In the previous section we document a contemporaneous relation between the decision to enter ex-
port markets or expand the number of (new) varieties and the change in the number of hierarchical
layers in the firm, i.e. adding managers when there were not before. However it does not test the
(causal) direction of the relation. In what follows we discuss the economic mechanisms explain-
ing why export diversification may lead changes in the workforce composition, and the ones which
could support the opposite channel. Because none of the directions can be easily discarded, we will
use an instrumental variable approach in the following section to test the causal impact of export
diversification on the addition of a layer of management.
5.3.1 The economic mechanisms
Our empirical framework supposes a relationship going from trade diversification to organizational
changes. Any change in a firm’s labor organization would be driven by its willingness to move for-
ward to adjust to its competitive or institutional environment, for example a demand shock on for-
eign markets, or a preferred access to particular markets (for instance through a change in trade
costs). We may expect that a firm will not implement organizational changes without strong rea-
sons to do it, because changing the workforce composition and organisation is costly and induces
sunk fixed costs.
Another rationale behind the impact of exports on the organisation of labour could be a change
in the bargaining power of the workforce. For instance, if export access or diversification increases
export revenues, workers may ask either for more responsibilities and managerial functions, or for
higher wages.
On the other hand, could there be shocks to the labor organisation of the firm which would
facilitate export diversification? We can explore a few (specific) cases. The first is the case of a
merger or acquisition (M&A) wich implies a change in the workforce and can lead to a change in the
portfolio of varieties. The second is associated with a strong governmental policy reducing the cost
of hiring managers (or high-skilled/high-wage workers). If we cannot totally discard the first case
for some of the firms, such an external growth event can be captured by the growth in value added.
In turn, the second case did not happen in France under the period of study.
Last, we could imagine that a change in trade diversification due to a domestic supply shock
(the inability to produce a certain variety, a break in the value chain), would occur simultaneously
with a change in employment (caused by the domestic supply shock) such that we would observe
a change in the workforce composition together with export diversification, but due to an external
unobserved factor.
5.3.2 Method
Based on the above discussion, we want to find an exogenous shock to export diversification, which
is not associated to the firm’s labor organisation decisions. One possible case is a demand shock
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in export markets. In order to construct our instrument, we build on the one in Mayer et al (2016),
where the authors are interested in the impact of demand shocks in export markets on firm produc-
tivity through a reallocation effect: a change in the product portfolio of the firm. More precisely they
mainly evaluate the change in the skewness of export sales toward the firm’s best-performing prod-
uct as a consequence of the growth in imports from non-French firms in the firms’ export markets.
They document that, as a response to a surge in competition, as proxied by such a demand shock,
firms concentrate on their core products (the skewness of their portfolio of products increases).
In order to use their instrument, we face a methodological issue related to the measurement of
the (exogenous) export demand shocks. Mayer et al (2016) compute trade demand shocks at the
firm-product-destination level or at the firm-industry-destination level. The same firm can therefore
enter the regression for different industry-destination combinations as separate observations, in
the same year. Instead, our regressions are executed at the firm level, because firm labor charac-
teristics and labor use cannot be disentangled across products and destinations. We then decide
to aggregate the demand shocks faced by a firm over all its product-destination couples. In order
to do so, we proceed as follows:
1. We measure total (log) non-French imports by product-destination in year t: logMHS6d,t . Weuse data at the country-HS6 level from the BACI-UN Comtrade database. To simplify nota-
tion, we write the demand from non-French origins into the product-destination variety θ as
logMHS6d,t = logM
θ
t .
2. We then compute the average demand faced by each firm i for all product-destination vari-
eties θ = 1 . . .Θ in its current product-destination portfolio defined at period t, Φi,t as the
unweighted mean over logM θt :
D
Φi,t
i,t = logM
θ
t =
1
Θ
∑
θ∈Φi,t
logM θt
For instance, if a firm i exports three varieties in 2009, the international demandDΦi,ti,t is thesum of imports from all countries in those markets in 2009.
3. The demand shock is then the growth of international demand in the markets in which the
firm was present in the previous period. So in 2010, the firm considers the markets it knows
(those in its portfolio in 2009) and evaluates their growth from 2009 to 2010. On this basis it
may decide to modify its portfolio of varieties in 2010. Following Mayer et al (2016), we define
the trade demand shock as the following change in demand:
∆˜Di,t = (D
Φi,t−1
i,t −DΦi,t−1i,t−1 )/(.5DΦi,t−1i,t + .5DΦi,t−1i,t−1 )
We compute this trade shock for each firm-year from 2009 to 2015. Note that the portfolio
structure is adjusted in each year t, based on the information in t−1. We do so because we want to
correlate the change in the trade diversification and the demand shock. By excluding France from
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the source of imports, we nevertheless keep the demand shock independent from French exporters’
own performance.
We then estimate the impact of the firm-specific shock ∆˜Di,t on the five proxies of export di-
versification in the first stage of a 2SLS regression (Eq. 17), where Exp=[log(# var); ∆HHI; New var;
Share new var.; log(# new var.)] In the second stage (Eq. 18), the predicted value of the export di-
versification variable from the first stage is included as a regressor to estimate its impact on the
dependent variableAdding:
Expi,t = β0 + β1∆˜Di,t + β2Xi,t + β3σj + β4λt + i,t (17)
Addingi,t = γ0 + γ1 ˆExpi,t + γ2Xi,t + γ3σj + γ4λt + µi,t (18)
In both equations, we also include a set of control variables Xi,t, sector fixed effects σj and
time fixed effects λt. i,t and µi,t are the error terms.
5.3.3 Results
The instrumental variable ∆˜Di,t appears to be quite symmetric with a median and mean of 0.003
and 0.004 respectively, slightly skewed to the positive side (-0.006). We remove outliers of the
variable, identified as the values above |0.2|, which corresponds to the first and 99th percentiles of
the distribution.
The results presented in Table 10, Panel A, show that the first stage is valid and highly significant
for three out of the five proxies of export diversification (columns 1, 3 and 5). The instrument is
particularly suited for the variables identifying changes at the extensive margin: an increase in the
number of varieties, in the number of new varieties and in the occurrence of new varieties. For those
variables, a positive demand shock triggers an increase in export diversification. Instead it is not
significantly associated with the variables documenting the structure of the portfolio, that is, the
share of the new varieties and the change in the concentration of varieties.
The second stage of the 2SLS estimation then shows that when the first stage is significant
(columns 1, 3 and 5), export diversification has a positive and significant causal impact on the prob-
ability to add a layer a managers. The results are confirmed when measuring export variables at
the 4-digit level (Panel B). In addition, they are clearly stronger in Panel B with respect to Panel A,
showing that the causal impact of export diversification on workforce composition is affected by
the distance (in terms of product characteristics here) between the existing and new varieties.
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Table 10: Labor organization change and trade diversification
Dependent Var. : Adding a layer of managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: IV Regressions - 8-digit variety
First stage
∆ Tilde 1.588*** 0.025 0.275*** 0.038 0.942***
R-squared 0.255 0.006 0.442 0.313 0.192
Second stage
Log # Varieties 0.079***
∆ Herfind. 4.971
Dummy new var. 0.560***
Share new var. 4.018
Log # New Varieties 0.124**
Log Growth VA 0.013*** 0.120 0.001 -0.113 0.008**
Exp. Int. -0.083* 0.103 -0.054 -0.093 -0.103
Log # Occupations 0.169*** 0.167*** 0.156*** 0.058 0.171***
Log Labor Prod. -0.005 0.016 0.002 0.046 -0.005
Log Size -0.046*** 0.001 -0.031*** v 0.023 -0.051***
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Nb. obs 50,521 50,521 40,573 40,573 34,159
WaldChi2 520498.46 38154.62 249034.26 56771.27 298799.72
Panel B: IV Regressions - 4-digit variety
First stage
∆ Tilde 0.886*** 0.003 0.209*** 0.011 0.387***
R-squared 0.242 0.005 0.341 0.235 0.082
Second stage
Log # Varieties 0.141**
∆ Herfind. 44.092
Dummy new var. 0.638***
Share new var. 11.743
Log # New Varieties 0.394**
Log Growth VA 0.016*** 0.911 0.002 -0.311 0.001
Exp. Int. -0.168** 0.386 -0.089 -0.302 -0.137
Log # Occupations 0.163*** 0.162 0.146*** 0.155 0.179***
Log Labor Prod. -0.014* 0.091 -0.001 0.091 -0.013
Log Size -0.062*** 0.127 -0.033*** 0.101 -0.064**
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Nb. obs 50,521 50,521 43,078 43,078 22,113
WaldChi2 361321.43 556.88 215450.26 20566.54 95589.50
Sources: DADS-FARE-Customs, Sample 2.
Firms with no layer of management in year t− 1.
Standard errors clustered at firm level.
25
6 Conclusion.
This study investigates the impact of export expansion (i.e., export entry and export diversification)
on the labor structure of firms. Supported by a simplemodel of amulti-product firmwhich decides to
diversify, we test the hypothesis that firms’ workforce composition, and notably their management
level, results from the complexity to deal with problems generated by export diversification.
We found that the organizational structure of exporting firms is more complex than that of non-
exporting firms, as they present a higher probability to have a layer of management on average.
Our empirical results support the main features described by the model. A firm that decides
to enter foreign markets or augment its number of export varieties must implement organizational
changes to face the complexity raised by the increase in its scope of varieties. First, we identify the
impact of trade entry on the labor organization of a firm, as measured by the likelihood of adding
a layer of managerial occupations. We show that export entry has a different impact on the labor
organization than does a mere change in size (here, value added growth). Our results support a
positive relationship between a firm’s trade diversification and the likelihood that it changes its
labor organization. We find that firms expanding their export portfolio have a higher probability of
adding managerial layers, after controlling for firm growth, and we confirm these results with an
instrumental variable approach.
In the framework of Mayer et al (2016), holding the firm-product productivity constant, overall
firm productivity changes “mechanically" from the reallocation effects (i.e. via a higher weight of
the higher-productivity products). We hypothesize that an additional channel is likely to play: we
suggest that trade demand shocks may affect firms’ labor organisation, which is then associated
both to a change in the product portfolio and to a change in the overall productivity of the firm (so,
(unobservable) firm-product productivity would then change too).
Overall, we obtain a body of evidence that supports a positive relation between export diversifi-
cation and change in labor organization through the addition of layers of management.
One limit of our analysis is that we do not address the narrowing of a firm’s varieties portfolio.
Dropping a product or a destination could signal the decision to invest abroad instead of exporting.
The FDI option and its impact on the skills of the workforce were explored by Laffineur andMouhoud
(2015) using French data. Future research could adapt our current framework to account for such
process. Our research agenda also relates to the import activity of the firm, which may have a non-
negligible effect on its labor organization.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Equation 10
Starting from the following cost function:
C(θ, A, z) = nwω + nmkω (A.1)
We minimize the cost function relative to nω under two constraints, given by (5) and (6). The
Lagrangian to minimize is then as follows:
min{L(θ, A, z)} = min
{
nwω + nmkω + φ
[
qj − A
(
1− e− zmθ
)
nw
]}
(A.2)
Let nm = 1, then nw is the number of workers per manager. The relation between managers
and workers is then as follows:
nw =
1
h
e(
1
θ
)z (A.3)
Substituting in (A.2), we get the following:
min{L(θ, A, z)} = min
{
nwω + kω + φ
[
q − A
(
1− e− zmθ
)
e
z
θ
h
]}
(A.4)
∂L
∂nw
= ω − φA
(
1− e− zmθ
)
= 0 (A.5)
Hence, from this equation, we can extract the value of φ, the marginal cost of production (∂L
∂q
),
as follows:
υ(θ, A, z) = φ =
ω
A
(
1− e− zmθ
) (A.6)
Note that it increases with θ and decreases with the managers’ skill.
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B. Additional tables
B. 1 Additional specifications – Probability of adding a layer of management and
export entry
Table B. 1. 1: Impact of export entry on the probability of adding a layer of management, 2009-2015.
With Sector-year FE.
Dependent Var. : Adding a layer of managers
OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exp. entry 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
Log Growth VA 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
Gr VA * Exp 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Log Labor Prod. 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
Log Occupations 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
Log Size -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Sector-Year FE yes yes yes yes
Nb. obs 1,154,960 1,154,960 1,154,960 1,154,960
R-squared 0.08 0.08
Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.21
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000
Firms with no layer of management in year t− 1.
OLS standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Displaying probit average marginal effects.
Table B. 1. 2: Impact of export entry on the probability of adding a layer of management, 2009-2015.
Only Manufacturing.
Dependent Var. : Adding a layer of managers
OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exp. entry 0.019∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
Log Growth VA 0.001 0.000 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
Gr VA * Exp 0.022∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
Log Labor Prod. 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
Log Occupations 0.085∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
Log Size -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Nb. obs 309,443 309,443 309,443 309,443
R-squared 0.08 0.08
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.20
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000
Sources: DADS-FARE, Sample 1.
Firms with no layer of management in year t− 1.
OLS standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Displaying probit average marginal effects.
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Table B. 1. 3: Impact of export entry on the probability of adding a layer of management, 2009-2015.
Excluding Controls.
Dependent Var. : Adding a layer of managers
Probit
(1) (2)
Exp. entry 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
Log Growth VA 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
Gr VA * Exp 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Log Labor Prod. 0.001∗∗∗
Log Size 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
Year FE yes yes
Sector FE yes yes
Nb. obs 1,154,960 1,154,960
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.08
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000
Sources: DADS-FARE, Sample 1.
Firms with no layer of management in year t− 1.
Displaying probit average marginal effects.
B. 2 Additional specifications – Labor organization change and trade diversifi-
cation
Table B. 2. 4: Labor organization change and trade diversification, 2009-2015. Excluding controls.
Probit Regressions - 8-digit variety
Dep. Var. : Adding a layer of managers
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy new var. 0.047∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.009∗∗
Log Growth VA 0.025∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
Exp. Int. -0.008∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
Log Labor Prod. 0.011∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
Log Size -0.088∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗
Log # Occupations 0.198∗∗∗
Year FE yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes
Nb. obs 41,721 41,721 41,721
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.15
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sources: DADS-FARE, Sample 1.
Firms with no layer of management in year t− 1.
Displaying probit average marginal effects.
32
Table B. 2. 5: Labor organization change and trade diversification - Probit, 2009-2015. With Sector-
Year FE.
Dependent Var. : Adding a layer of managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Probit Regressions - 8-digit variety
Log # Varieties 0.006∗∗∗
∆ Herfind. -0.011∗∗
Dummy new var. 0.009∗∗
Share new var. 0.026∗∗∗
Log # New Varieties 0.010∗∗∗
Log Growth VA 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
Exp. Int. 0.045∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
Log # Occupations 0.193∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
Log Labor Prod. 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
Log Size -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.037***
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Nb. obs 52,435 52,435 41,695 41,695 35,437
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Probit Regressions - 4-digit variety
Log # Varieties 0.007***
∆ Herfind. -0.007
Dummy new var. 0.012***
Share new var. 0.027***
Log # New Varieties 0.009***
Log Growth VA 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.014***
Exp. Int. 0.045*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.057***
Log # Occupations 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.209***
Log Labor Prod. 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008**
Log Size -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.040***
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Nb. obs 52,435 52,435 44,373 44,373 22,944
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sources: DADS-FARE-Customs, Sample 2.
Firms with no layer of management in year t− 1.
Displaying probit average marginal effects.
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Table B. 2. 6: Labor organization change and trade diversification - Probit, 2009-2015. Excluding
controls.
Dependent Var. : Adding a layer of managers
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy new var. 0.047*** 0.021*** 0.009**
Log Growth VA 0.025*** 0.010*** 0.010***
Exp. Int. -0.008 0.044*** 0.055***
Log Labor Prod. -0.018*** 0.011*** 0.009***
Log Size 0.008**** -0.034***
Log # Occupations 0.198***
Year FE yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes
Nb. obs 47,721 47,721 47,721
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sources: DADS-FARE-Customs, Sample 2.
Firms with no layer of management in year t− 1.
Displaying probit average marginal effects.
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Table B. 2. 7: Labor organization change and trade diversification - Probit, 2009-2015. Only manu-
facturing.
Dependent Var. : Adding a layer of managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Probit Regressions - 8-digit variety
Log # Varieties 0.003
∆ Herfind. 0.001
Dummy new var. -0.007
Share new var. 0.005
Log # New Varieties 0.007∗
Log Growth VA 0.012∗ 0.011∗ 0.009 0.009 0.013
Exp. Int. 0.042∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
Log # Occupations 0.202∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
Log Labor Prod. 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
Log Size -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
Nb. obs 14,053 14,053 11,559 11,559 8,923
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Probit Regressions - 4-digit variety
Log # Varieties 0.003
∆ Herfind. 0.001
Dummy new var. 0.000
Share new var. 0.011
Log # New Varieties 0.001
Log Growth VA 0.012∗ 0.011∗ 0.010 0.010 0.004
Exp. Int. 0.042∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
Log # Occupations 0.202∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
Log Labor Prod. 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
Log Size -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes
Nb. obs 14,053 14,053 12,205 12,205 5,933
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
Prob LR test statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sources: DADS-FARE-Customs, Sample 2.
Firms with no layer of management in year t− 1.
Displaying probit average marginal effects.
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ABOUT OFCE 
The Paris-based Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE), or French Economic 
Observatory is an independent and publicly-funded centre whose activities focus on economic research, 
forecasting and the evaluation of public policy. 
 
Its 1981 founding charter established it as part of the French Fondation nationale des sciences politiques 
(Sciences Po), and gave it the mission is to “ensure that the fruits of scientific rigour and academic 
independence serve the public debate about the economy”. The OFCE fulfils this mission by conducting 
theoretical and empirical studies, taking part in international scientific networks, and assuring a regular 
presence in the media through close cooperation with the French and European public authorities. The work 
of the OFCE covers most fields of economic analysis, from macroeconomics, growth, social welfare 
programmes, taxation and employment policy to sustainable development, competition, innovation and 
regulatory affairs. 
 
 
ABOUT SCIENCES PO 
Sciences Po is an institution of higher education and research in the humanities and social sciences.  Its work 
in law, economics, history, political science and sociology is pursued through ten research units and several 
crosscutting programmes. 
 
Its research community includes over two hundred twenty members and three hundred fifty PhD 
candidates.  Recognized internationally, their work covers a wide range of topics including education, 
democracies, urban development, globalization and public health.   
One of Sciences Po’s key objectives is to make a significant contribution to methodological, epistemological 
and theoretical advances in the humanities and social sciences.  Sciences Po’s mission is also to share the 
results of its research with the international research community, students, and more broadly, society as a 
whole.  
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